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State fragility and conflict nexus:  




Although research on natural resource and ethnic identity-based conf lict 
abounds, studies which critically examine how the state fragility–conf lict 
nexus shapes the contemporary security of the Horn of Africa are rather 
limited. Qualitatively designed, this study attempts to explore and explain 
security implications of such a nexus. Analysis of the regional security 
complex (RSC) and empirical data from the field reveal that conf lict 
dynamics feed and fuel state fragility in the Horn of Africa sub-region. The 
presence of extra-regional security actors, who are competing for military 
bases along the coast of Djibouti, the spill-over effects of violence in Yemen, 
and the Iran–Saudi power rivalry, together with incompetent regional 
political leadership, tend to shape the security of the Horn. Hence, a new and 
innovative approach to contemporary security and political commitment 
are sine qua non since the existing institutions and policies are not fully 
capable of coping with the need for a new security regionalism. It is hoped 
that the recent rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, albeit at an 
embryonic stage, is and will be a positive force capable of bringing about a 
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paradigm shift in security structure, and inducing a viable and sustainable 
economic, political and security community in the Horn of Africa. 
Keywords: conf lict dynamics, Horn of Africa, military bases, political 
community, regional security complex, state fragility
Introduction 
While research on natural resource or ethnic identity-based conf licts in 
the Horn of Africa is widely available, studies which examine how the 
state fragility–conflict dynamics nexus shapes, and has implications for, the 
contemporary security of the sub-region are rather limited. State fragility, 
in this context, is the weakness of state institutions to provide physical 
security, including the basic good of the survival of citizens. Such weakness 
leads to corruption, ineffectiveness, undemocratic practices, as well 
as failure of state authority and legitimacy. By their very nature, fragile 
states lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their 
borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their 
populations, and the political legitimacy to effectively represent their 
citizens at home and abroad (Clapham 2005:6–10). Conf lict dynamics, 
on the other hand, are violent, variable, interactive, and interdependent 
acts, which are manifestations of the urgency of the needs and goals of the 
actors. Conf lict dynamics may be conceptualised as a cause, a symptom 
or a consequence of state fragility. Violent conf lict and state fragility fuel 
each other in the Horn of Africa as realities on the ground demonstrate. 
In other words, state authority, effectiveness and legitimacy in the Horn 
are weakened by the damaging effects of violent conflict, and state fragility 
manifests itself in and contributes to the conf lict process with a serious 
consequence to the contemporary sub-regional security (Clapham 2017:17; 
Coleman and Tieku 2018:13). Hence, I argue in this article that the state 
fragility–conf lict dynamics nexus is the most critical factor in shaping the 
contemporary security of the Horn of Africa.
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The objective of the present study is, therefore, to explore and explain the 
contemporary security implications of the nexus between state fragility and 
conf lict dynamics in the sub-region. And the significance of the study lies 
in what it may contribute to scholarly literature and debate in the discipline 
as well as to coherent security policies and strategies in the Horn of Africa. 
The article has been structured as follows: first, it has already introduced 
a short background of the study, which is followed by a brief description of 
the research context where extra-regional security actors and their role in 
state fragility and violent conf lict in the Horn have been outlined. Third, it 
lays out a framework of analysis and justifies why a regional security complex 
(RSC) is preferable in the Horn context. In addition, it discusses the nexus 
between state fragility and conf lict dynamics in the Horn of Africa today. 
Finally, it analyses and synthesises how the nexus shapes the contemporary 
security of the sub-region, and it draws a conclusion. The study makes 
use of qualitative data collected from previous and current works on the 
theme, in-depth interviews with conveniently selected expert political 
cum policy analysts and civil society activists as well as online materials 
pertaining to the research context, which is described and discussed in the 
following section.
Research context
Three major points depict the research context: First, a brief physical and 
socio-political description of the Horn is provided; second, patterns of 
violent conf licts and state fragility in the sub-region are discussed; and 
finally, some of the major implications of the presence of external security 
actors or ‘security overlays’ in posing potential and actual security threats 
to the Horn are summarised.  
To begin with, located in northeast Africa (see Figure 1, below), the Horn of 
Africa is composed of six countries with a population of nearly 130 million 
and an area of 1 882 757 km2 (2016 estimate). 
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Of the six Horn countries, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan 
and South Sudan, two (Ethiopia and South Sudan with a total population 
of about 115 million) are landlocked and most urgently need seaports as 
outlets. They are currently also in dire need of sub-regional cooperation 
for economic, security, social and political purposes. It is worth noting 
at this juncture that these six countries were the former four countries, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Ethiopia became Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, whereas Sudan split up into Sudan and South Sudan. Hence, the 
rationale of using the six countries as comprising the Horn of Africa lies 
in their contemporary political history of conf lict dynamics, fragility, 
and finally, the secession of the newly born countries of Eritrea and South 
Sudan. The Horn has eight major seaports: Assab, Massawa, Djibouti, 
Berbera, Bossaso, Mogadishu, Kismayu, and Port Sudan. Easy access to a 
seaport is essential for trade and security, but economic interdependence is 
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a factor of amicable relations and provides a sense of community amongst 
the Horn countries. It is to be noted that the pre-1991 Ethiopia was a coastal 
state, but because of ‘the wrong political decisions made by the EPRDF 
[Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front] regime, the country 
remained landlocked, with implications for potential violent conf lict 
leading to further state fragility and insecurity in the Horn’.1
Second, patterns of state fragility and violent conf lict dynamics in the sub-
region loomed larger towards the end of the Cold War, which marked the 
end of competition between the then superpowers, the United States (US) 
and the Soviet Union (USSR), to find proxies and allies in the Horn of 
Africa. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the international community 
appeared to have lost appetite to engage with the sub-region. The vacuum of 
external interest is currently being filled largely by the Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
Al-Shabaab, which maintains a momentum of wanton killing and 
destruction in Somalia with spill-over effects beyond the Horn. 
These originated and spread mainly from Kenya, but also from the 
devastating and erratic civil wars in South Sudan, which continued 
unabated irrespective of the mediation efforts by major global, regional 
and sub-regional actors, and from the unresolved internal violent conflicts 
in Sudan, mainly in Darfur. These conf licts are still going on at the time 
of writing, and have led to the overthrow in April 2019 of Omar al-Bashir, 
Sudan’s leader, after thirty years in power (BBC News 2019). 
Another kind of ‘on and off ’ conf lict dynamics has appeared since the 
2008 Eritrea–Djibouti border conf licts in Ras Dumera, which has caused 
relations between the countries to f luctuate between ‘on’ and ‘off ’. 
Even greater uncertainty was reached after Djibouti’s opposition to the 
lifting of United Nations (UN) sanctions against Eritrea in August 2018. 
The Eritrea–Ethiopia relations had been in a state of ‘no-war, no-peace’ 
until the July 2018 sudden, yet official end of the twenty-year stalemate 
and the commencement of a rapprochement under the leadership of the 
new Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed Ali (Underwood 2018:1–3).
1 In-depth interviews with a civil society leader, Addis Ababa, February 2018.
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As a result of the state fragility and conf lict situation, negative security 
externalities have prevailed in the contemporary Horn of Africa, largely 
in the form of internally displaced people, refugee f lows, transnational 
organised crimes, violent extremism and terrorism, illegal cross-border 
trades and f low of small arms and light weapons. The 2018 Global Peace 
Index and State Fragility Index reveal that the Horn is the most negatively 
affected region. It is the only region in Africa where secession movements 
succeeded in breaking away from the previously incorporated entities – in 
both cases (Eritrea and South Sudan) with a significant potential security 
implication for the region. Despite South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 
2011, thousands of its people have been killed in armed conf licts, and 
millions displaced since 15 December 2013. The fighting is entrenched in 
a power struggle between the main political contenders, with overtones 
of ethnic politics of the Dinka and Nuer, represented by President Salva 
Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machar respectively. In the same vein, Eritrea 
had been on conf lictual terms with most of its neighbours immediately 
following its independence in 1993, and remained in a state of ‘no-war, 
no-peace’ with Ethiopia from 2000 to July 2018 as stated above. 
Despite these dismal scenarios, however, the international engagement 
with the coastal side of the Horn seems to have increased since the turn 
of the 21st century (Verhoeven 2017) making the sub-region the centre 
of gravity for current ‘super-powers’ and some of the most powerful 
countries of the gulf region. This brought significant actual and potential 
security implications to the Horn of Africa, which is the third point to be 
discussed below.
Several extra-regional actors and their ‘security overlays’ (Buzan and Waever 
2003) are affecting security choices in the Horn, making state fragility and 
conf lict dynamics more complex and posing further security challenges. 
A number of military bases along the coast of Djibouti and Somalia have, for 
instance, been established by Saudi Arabia, UAE (United Arab Emirates), 
Turkey, China, Japan, the US, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), 
France, Germany and Italy. Major security developments have profiled the 
geo-strategic significance of the region from the perspectives of foreign 
actors, and over time the high concentration of security overlays have 
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created their own dynamics in the military base race. Governments within 
the Horn and in the larger region remained keen to exhibit more interest. 
Turkey, for instance, has established its first overseas military base – to date 
the largest in Mogadishu. The presence of such military and naval forces 
in the Horn has prompted security concerns from some of the member 
countries, however, including Ethiopia (Lee 2018:239; Zelalem 2018:24).
By virtue of being the former colonial power, the French have historically 
maintained a military base in Djibouti. This has emerged as a key factor for 
geo-political contestation between maritime powers owing to its strategic 
location adjacent to the Red Sea, which is estimated to account for almost 
4% of the world’s maritime traffic in petroleum and produce of petroleum 
(Lee 2018:240). After 9/11, the United States opened a military base in 
Djibouti as an operational base for its ‘War on Terror’ focusing on Al-Qaeda 
targets in Yemen and Somalia. In 2007, piracy became a critical security 
issue off the coast of Somalia, threatening maritime commerce in the busy 
trade routes through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This situation increased 
Djibouti’s attractiveness as the most preferred base for international anti-
piracy operations (Verhoeven 2017).
Unsurprisingly, the presence of these major powers in the Horn, each with 
its own military base, has attracted foreign rivalries to the Horn. China 
and Turkey, both currently ascending powers, are keen to translate their 
economic might into global security and political inf luence. China’s key 
interest in international maritime trade, which is compatible with its 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), made Djibouti the main route for Chinese 
exports to Europe. China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, 
adjacent to the Doraleh Multi-purpose Port in 2017 (Lee 2018:241). In the 
same vein, Turkish investments are drawn to the Horn in response to the 
increasing foreign presence. Hence, the substantial Gulf inf luence in the 
region made it relevant for the wider intra-Middle East competition, which 
later erupted in the form of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, 
pitting Qatar and Turkey against the Saudi-led coalition. Much like those 
of the UAE and China, Turkish military bases carry a link with commercial 
port deals. In late 2014, the Turkish firm Albayrak Group took over the 
management of Mogadishu’s port. At the end of 2017, Turkey announced 
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it had been given a lease to rebuild and operate Suakin, a former Ottoman 
port city in north-eastern Sudan. The agreement reportedly includes naval 
facilities and Sudanese–Turkish military cooperation (see Lee 2018:241; 
Zelalem 2018:20).
In a nutshell, the Horn of Africa is becoming a centre of contestation for 
major external global and regional actors. It should not be surprising if 
the countries of the Horn show their concern about the current and 
emerging security threats by observing who allies with whom, and what 
the consequence of such alignment might be. The complex nature of 
historical, cultural, ideological and religious intricacies between the 
Horn of Africa and the Middle East, competition between Riyadh and 
Teheran through their proxies, and presence of global actors from the 
West and the East, further complicate the security landscape of the sub-
region. Sudan as well as Ethiopia are engaged in dam constructions for 
the development of their respective countries; Somaliland is in dire need 
of international recognition as a sovereign state; South Sudan and Sudan 
are replete with violence and in a quagmire of civil war at the moment, 
although there appears to be some improvement; Djibouti and Eritrea are 
still on ‘bad neighbourhood’ terms; and Al-Shabaab has an upper hand 
on Somalia’s security. Furthermore, at the time of writing, Sudan has 
been excluded from the regional organisation, the African Union (AU) 
for the unconstitutional change of government (BBC News 2019). It may 
be inferred that each country of the Horn is fragile to some degree and 
has specific economic, political, security and social aspirations and fears 
that can effectively be addressed only collectively and interdependently 
through a regional security complex (RSC) approach, which is the subject 
of the following section. 
Regional Security Complex as a framework of analysis
The RSC approach assumes a region to be: ‘a set of units whose major 
processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked 
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved 
apart from one another’ (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998:10–15). In 
the case of the Horn of Africa, the ‘units’ (countries) are characterised by 
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durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of geographically 
coherent patterns of security interdependence. The essential structure of 
an RSC embodies: (1) a boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its 
neighbours; (2) anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be 
composed of two or more autonomous units; (3) polarity, which covers 
the distribution of power among the units; and (4) social construction, 
which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units (Buzan and 
Waever 2003:53; Kay 2007:68–69).
Four points constitute the rationale for focusing on the regional level when 
investigating contemporary security implications of the nexus between 
state fragility and violent conf lict dynamics in the Horn of Africa. First, the 
existing scholarship tends to seek the causes of state fragility, incomplete 
sovereignty or the absence of effective state authority over territory, in either 
purely systemic (global/international) or purely domestic (national/local) 
explanations (Lee 2018:285). On the contrary, the post-Cold War security 
problems confronting the contemporary world are found and addressed 
at the regional level. They are manifested, according to Lepgold (2003:3), 
in at least two ways: (1) the degree of negative security externalities in the 
region (how much a given conf lict spills over or affects others); and (2) the 
extent to which there are states or other institutions as well as politically 
committed and transformative leaders capable of managing conf lict in the 
region. I concur with the foregoing argument that conf lict dynamics in 
the Horn of Africa arise from state fragility and they come in ‘a regional 
package’ (Zartman 2003:83–84). In other words, most if not all of the Horn 
of Africa conf licts do not take place between well-established states, but 
mostly inside states which are not in control of their internal dynamics, 
i.e. ungoverned spaces with privatised economies and security, and 
competing rebel groups, as well as multinational forces, vying for control 
of political space as evidenced in Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan at 
present. This means the locus of conf lict and its management will become 
largely region-based. Hence, efforts to cope with violent conf licts, as well 
as to achieve order and security, will primarily involve arrangements 
and actions designed and implemented at the sub-regional level 
(Lepgold 2003:3; Zartman 2003:83–84; Lee 2018:239).
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Second, in unstable communities or ‘bad neighbourhoods’ (Brown 
2001:209), conf licts spread across states when internal turmoil pushes 
refugees away from danger and toward safety, or when soldiers use adjacent 
territory as sanctuaries. Conf lict can also diffuse across boundaries 
through a process of social learning. A group that sees itself as marginalised 
at home might develop a stronger sense of its identity, and thereby its 
dissatisfaction, by observing a comparable struggle in other states. Groups 
that already are discontented might learn from conf licts elsewhere how 
they can become less vulnerable or more autonomous and metamorphose 
into a non-state actor status (see Buzan and Waever 2003:29–30). Security 
dynamics theoretically have a strong territoriality, and on this basis it can 
accommodate non-state actors without too much difficulty. Although 
some aspects of the new security agenda are de-territorialised, such as 
economic and environmental sectors, territoriality remains a primary 
defining feature of many (in)security dynamics. A regional approach can 
therefore provide both a much clearer empirical picture and a theoretically 
more coherent understanding of security dynamics (Buzan and Waever 
2003:29–30).
Third, security dynamics are inherently relational, and therefore no 
nation’s security is self-contained. Nevertheless, studies of ‘national 
security’ often implicitly place their own state at the centre of an ad hoc 
‘context’ without a grasp of the systemic or sub-systemic context in its 
own right. In contrast, the region, or sub-region in the case of the Horn 
of Africa, refers to the level where states or other units link together 
sufficiently closely so that their securities cannot be considered separately 
from each other. The regional level is where the extremes of national and 
global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs. The general 
picture is about the conjunction of two levels: the interplay of the global 
powers at the system level, and clusters of close security interdependence at 
the regional level. Each regional security complex is made up of the fears 
and aspirations of the separate units (which in turn partly derive from 
domestic features and fractures). Both the security of the separate units 
and the process of global power intervention can be grasped only through 
understanding the regional security dynamics, which usually share 
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borders with other regional security complexes (see Buzan and Waever 
2003:43; Kay 2007:213–287).
To grasp the full picture of the Horn, it is worth pointing out that the 
Horn of Africa RSC itself borders with the Middle East RSC whose pattern 
of security interdependence comprises more than twenty countries. 
The Middle East RSC stretches from Morocco to Israel and Iran, and 
it includes all of the Arab states (see Buzan and Waever 2003:187). 
It developed three sub-complexes: the Levant, the Gulf, and the Maghreb. 
A case might sometimes be made that the Horn of Africa constitutes a 
fourth weak sub-complex in this set (see Buzan and Waever 2003:188). 
Evidently, Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan are all members of the Arab 
League, and there is a clear and persistent pattern of conf lict and hostile 
intervention connecting them with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and sometimes even 
Egypt. However, Clapham (1996:128–129) and Tibi (1993:52, 59) argue that 
the Horn RSC is part of sub-Saharan Africa, and should not be considered 
part of the Middle East (as quoted in Buzan and Waever 2003:188) with 
which I concur. 
From the three Middle East sub-RSCs outlined above, the Gulf Complex, 
which is subsumed under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is the 
most important one for its immediate neighbourhood to and significant 
impact on the Horn of Africa RSC. Centred on a triangular rivalry among 
Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, the GCC was 
originally composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE 
and Oman. It was formed in 1981 in response to the Iraq–Iran war, and is 
generally understood as being a response to fear of them (Tibi 1993:171). 
The 1979 revolution in Iran added a sharp ideological element to its rivalry 
with Saudi Arabia, since both states claimed leadership of competing 
Islamic universalisms (Chubin and Tripp 1996:15, 71). Egypt, although a 
central player in the Arab–Israeli conf lict, is also prominent in the Gulf. 
It intervened extensively in Yemen during the 1960s, and during the 
Second Gulf War sided with the Gulf Arab states and Syria against Iraq 
(Tibi 1993:171). Currently, its presence is felt in the GCC and in the 
Djibouti military base race as has been discussed above. Hence, ‘the 
GCC is as much a means of reinforcing the domestic security of a set of 
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anachronistic monarchical regimes as an alliance against external threats’ 
(Acharya 1992:150). In short, the regional security dynamics of the Middle 
East RSC were exceptionally strong, and deeply rooted in the character of 
local politics and history (Tibi 1993:171). The impact of the global level 
has also been strong during the Cold War as well as the post-Cold War era 
on this RSC. In addition, there has been a rivalry between Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen (and within Yemen), which has generated a lot of local wars, 
(still going on at the time of writing, mainly as proxy of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia) and has at times drawn in wider Arab participation along rival 
royalist versus radical lines.
Consequently, the pouring in of small arms and light weapons, refugees 
f leeing the violence in Yemen to the Horn of Africa, and competition of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran to have allies from the Horn countries, using their 
commercial projects, investment, trade and aid leverage, are clear evidence 
of the effect of the proxy war in the contemporary Yemen on the Horn of 
Africa RSC. What is more, the close interaction with and allegiance of some 
of the Horn RSC countries, e.g. Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan, to the Arab 
League, is a conspicuous demonstration of the linkage of the two RSCs 
with far-reaching socio-cultural, economic, political and security effects. 
Even though these effects are not the object of analysis of this article, it 
ought to be underlined that their interface plays vital roles in the RSCs of 
both security clusters.
Equally important, in parallel with the GCC in the Gulf RSC, is the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as a regional 
economic community, which includes but is not limited to the six Horn 
countries. Various studies (e.g. Tadesse and Yonas 2006:13) and empirical 
experience in the sub-region reveal that IGAD’s institutional and normative 
frameworks as security provider are weak as evidenced in the Eritrean–
Ethiopian, Somali–Al-Shabaab, South Sudan or Darfur–Sudan violent conflict 
cases. Moreover, IGAD includes Kenya and Uganda, which belong to the East 
African Community, not the Horn of Africa. Hence, even though IGAD is 
the regional economic community of the Horn of Africa, it was not treated 
as the primary agency of the Horn of Africa RSC in this article. Furthermore, 
if IGAD were to be made a primary target, the topic might shift its focus to 
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the Greater Horn of Africa or East Africa RSC, which is beyond the scope 
of this study. Hence, the traditional Horn countries and their security 
interdependence are the object of analysis instead of IGAD per se.
Finally, a regional approach specifies what to look for at four levels of 
analysis and how to interrelate them: (1) Domestically, in the states of 
the region, particularly their locally generated vulnerabilities. (2) State-
to-state relations, which generate the region as such. (3) The region’s 
interaction with neighbouring RSCs such as the Gulf RSC in the Middle 
East. Finally and essentially, (4) the roles of global powers in the region. 
With regard to the interrelatedness of the levels, it may be added that in 
the case of the Horn, the interplay between the global security structures 
(for instance, the presence of the US, China and Germany) and the 
regional security structures (mainly the presence of the Gulf countries) 
is of great importance (Buzan and Waever 2003:50–51; Kay 2007:12–19). 
On the whole, the regional approach is more of a necessity than a choice to 
understand the nexus between state fragility and conf lict dynamics in the 
Horn of Africa.
State fragility in the Horn of Africa
State fragility is understood and conceptualised in a number of ways. 
For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:376–377) as well as for Herbst 
(2000:254–255), state fragility is symbolised by extractive state institutions 
that expropriate power and wealth: thereby impoverish the people and 
block economic development, and at the same time initiate savage conf lict. 
Fukuyama (2012:10; 2015:302) implies that state fragility is the failure 
of the perceived legitimacy of the government that binds the population 
together by making them willing to accept its authority both internally 
and externally. Mills and others (2017:231) point out that ten of the sixteen 
countries in the ‘very high alert’ categories in the 2016 Fragile States Index 
are in sub-Saharan Africa. They further state that six of the bottom ten 
countries in Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perception 
Index are African. As empirical evidence reveals, in the ‘Horn of Africa, 
states are fragile and their structures lack political will and capacity to 
provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development 
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and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’.2 
Daily experience demonstrates in Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and in 
some parts of Ethiopia since 1991 (e.g. Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, 
South Omo, Ethiopia Somali Region, Oromia Region of Moyale, Gedeo and 
Guji, Sidama and Wolaita of Southern Regional State, various parts of the 
Amhara National Regional state, to mention just a few) how the failure of 
state institutions to maintain basic security leads to violent conf lict and 
violent conf lict fuels state fragility. This situation plays a major role in 
shaping the contemporary security of the sub-region as small arms and light 
weapons are being circulated en mass, refugees f lee their abode, statistics of 
internally displaced people as well as trans-border organised crimes swell 
up. Consequently, ungoverned spaces are being created, and serve as safe 
haven for non-state actors who claim to provide security to their respective 
communities at grassroots by further weakening already fragile states of 
the Horn as, for instance, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. 
It follows that when fragility refers to the situation in the Horn, it implies 
that fragility is in fact a property of the prevalent political system. A ‘fragile 
state’, hence, is incapable of fulfilling its responsibility as a provider of 
basic services and public goods, which in turn undermines its legitimacy. 
This has consequences for society as a whole: threatening livelihoods, 
increasing economic downturn and causing other related crises which 
affect human security and the likelihood of widespread armed conf lict in 
the sub-region (see Fragile State Index Team 2018).
Regional Security Complex analysis of the Horn further demonstrates that 
primordial enmity or resource deficiency is not as much a critical factor 
for conf lict in the Horn of Africa as the failure of authority, legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the state (see Deng 1996:48; Zartman 2003:82; Wolf 
2011:951). The evidence comes from the current situations in Ethiopia 
and Somalia. The Hobbesian hypothesis is that in the absence of a 
political Leviathan, life for individuals will be nasty, brutish, and short 
(Hobbes 1999:96). In Somalia citizens live in constant fear of attacks from 
Al-Shabaab – a non-state actor, which emerged as a result of the failure 
2 In-depth interview with a political/policy analyst, Addis Ababa, March 2018.
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of authority, legitimate power and effectiveness of the state. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the horror of extreme political repression reigned in Ethiopia 
during the military regime, the worst case of which was ushered in under 
the EPRDF regime since 2005. State-sponsored terrorism based on ethnic 
identity politics indeed made life of individual citizens nasty, brutish and 
short, but fortunately, since April 2018, there are some modest positive 
changes in Ethiopia in terms of openness and a democratisation process.
It is legitimate to argue that in the Horn of Africa state fragility is more 
responsible for violent conflict dynamics than economic underdevelopment – 
as the analysis of its RSC reveals. This does not mean, however, that 
political and economic developments can be divorced – as was frequently 
insinuated in the discourse on ‘developmental state’, particularly in the 
Ethiopian political-economy literature since 2005 (see Lefort 2015:360). 
Hence, the Horn of Africa’s economic and political failures are tightly 
linked with each other and with state fragility and violent conf lict 
dynamics. Economic improvement alone, even if it could be achieved, has 
therefore not broken the cycle of violence in Ethiopia. For more than two 
decades there has been double digit economic growth, but no end to the 
killings, forced disappearances, torching and dispossessing of citizens’ 
properties, and basic human rights violations across the country. It may 
be concluded that fragile states in their very nature are unable to meet, or 
at least manage their population’s demands and expectations through the 
political process (Verhoeven 2017:16). It may be inferred from the analysis 
of the Horn RSC that whereas the understanding of the security threats 
posed by fragile states merits further investigation, the lessons learned 
from the Horn of Africa indicate that fragile states are an ideal breeding 
ground for domestic or state-sponsored as well as international terrorism, 
national and transnational organised crimes, human trafficking, and 
armed conf licts.
Conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa 
In the context of the Horn of Africa, conf lict dynamics could be a cause, a 
symptom or a consequence of fragility, which explains why it is a dimension 
of most indices of fragile situations. What the analysis of the framework of 
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the RSC of the Horn portrays, is that the very state formation in the Horn 
of Africa is contested: hence, it is pregnant with conf lict dynamics from the 
outset. It is either a readymade gift from the colonial masters (top-down, 
except in the Ethiopian case), or a usurped possession acquired through 
a coup d’état or a rebellion by indigenes from the jungle (bottom-up). 
In either case the state does not represent the whole society; hence, it 
has neither de facto nor de jure legitimacy. Consequently, perceptions 
and feelings of exclusion from politics and ‘state ownership’, and/or of 
marginalisation from economic as well as social goods (such as education, 
health services and infrastructure), constitute conf lict dynamics which 
serve as a cause as well as a symptom of state fragility (see Clapham 2005; 
2017). State fragility in turn leads to civil unrest, communal violence and 
armed conflict (Collier and Sambanis 2005; UNESCO 2013; Williams 2015). 
When the state does not deliver the basic services it is supposed to, when its 
authority is limited or arbitrarily exercised, or its legitimacy systematically 
questioned, the social contract and public trust weaken to the point where 
public dissatisfaction easily transforms into violent contestation by sectors 
of society as has usually been the case in the Horn of Africa. In attempts 
to regain order, the state has often responded with violence to the violence 
caused by its own failures – as demonstrated specifically in Ethiopia since 
2005, South Sudan since 2013, and Darfur in Sudan since February 2003. 
As a result, the Horn of Africa RSC has remained the crucible of conf lict 
dynamics feeding and fuelling state fragility as the following discussion of 
their nexus further reveals.
The nexus between state fragility and conflict in the 
Horn of Africa
Almost all the countries of the Horn which comprise the RSC have 
experienced intra- and inter-state conf licts of varying degree and intensity 
over different time periods (see Kassahun 2012; Clapham 2017). What 
is visible on the ground in the Horn of Africa RSC is that the insecurity 
of ruling elites within their domestic sphere plays a significant role in 
shaping the dynamics of (in)security overall. As already pointed out, state 
fragility and violent conf lict dynamics are directly related in the Horn 
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of Africa. Consequently, their nexus shapes the contemporary security 
of the Horn. In the Global Peace Index, the level of peace in the Horn is 
labelled ‘medium’, ‘low’ or ‘very low’ as measured by using internal and 
external peace indicators (Global Peace Index 2018:80).3 Likewise, the 
State Fragility Index rates the status of the states in the Horn as ‘high 
warning’, ‘alert’, ‘high alert’ and ‘very high alert’ on the basis of input, process 
and output criteria (Fragile State Index Team 2018:16).4 As can be seen in 
Table 1, the higher the rank of the Global Peace Index and the total score of 
the State Fragility Index, the lower is the level of peace and the more severe 
the fragility of state in a given country.
3 Internal peace indicators include: (1) level of perceived criminality in the society; (2) 
number of internal security officers and police per 100 000 people; (3) number of 
homicides per 100 000 people; (4) ease of access to small arms and light weapons; 
(5) number of jailed persons per 100 000 people; (6) intensity of organised internal crimes; 
(7) intensity of violent crimes; (8) likelihood of violent demonstrations; (9) political 
instability; (10) political terror scale; (11) impact of terrorism; (12) number and duration 
of internal conflicts; (13) number of deaths from organised internal conflicts; (14) internal 
conflicts fought. External peace indicators include: (1) relations with neighbouring 
countries; (2) military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Gross domestic product); 
(3) financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions; (4) number of armed services 
personnel per 100 000 people; (5) refugees and IDPs; (6) weapon exports; (7) deaths from 
external conflicts; (8) external conflicts fought (9) nuclear and heavy weapon capabilities.
4 (1) Input indicators, also known as structural or de jure indicators, refer to the existence 
and quality of enabling structural conditions. Input indicators focus primarily on the legal 
framework, institutions and procedures in place in a given country. The testing questions 
commonly require ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. The questions are about issues as the following: the 
division of powers (executive, legislative, the judiciary) that guarantees the independence 
of the different branches of the state; the ratification of core international human rights 
conventions; the existence of regulations and public institutions overseeing public 
expenditure; country membership of regional and international organisations. (2) Process 
indicators, also known as responsibility or de facto indicators, measure efforts made to 
achieve certain outputs or outcomes. For example: health expenditure as percentage 
of GDP; military expenditure as percentage of GDP; international transfers of major 
conventional weapons; pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools; number of ex-combatants 
receiving professional training. (3) Output indicators, also known as performance 
indicators, measure results of actions. For example: number of conflict-related deaths per 
year; unemployment; violent demonstrations and social unrest; trade balance as percentage 
of GDP; incidents of victimisation that have been reported to the authorities. Regarding 
the generation of data, we distinguish four types relevant for measuring fragility: public 
statistics, expert data, opinion polls and content analysis.
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Table 1: The 2018 Global Peace and State Fragility Indices of 
the Horn of Africa
The 2018 Global Peace Index The 2018 State Fragility Index













index 6  
(Total 
score)




Djibouti Medium 2.269 115 High 
warning
87.1 42
Eritrea Low 2.522 138 Alert 97.2 19
Ethiopia Low 2.524 139 High 
alert
99.6 15
Sudan Very low 3.155 153 High 
alert
108.7 5










Source: Collated and tabulated by the author from Global Peace Index 2018 and State Fragility Index 2018 
5 Nations considered more peaceful have lower index, e.g. Iceland Global Peace Index of 
2018 is 1.096 whereas countries replete with violence (or low level of peace) have higher 
Global Peace Index such as South Sudan whose Global Peace Index is 3.508. Whereas 
Iceland ranks 1st among 163 countries (high level of peace), South Sudan ranks 161st 
(low level of peace). Simply put, violent countries have more militarisation, more internal 
and external violence going on at present and higher crime rate; hence, higher Global 
Peace Index. 
6 Nations considered more violent have higher Fragility Index; hence, ‘Very high alert level’ 
and least resilient or sustainable. For instance, Finland is the lowest in fragility index, 
16.9 and ranks 178th in fragility among 178 countries. It means Iceland is least fragile 
or most sustainable whereas South Sudan’s Fragility Index is 113.2 and it ranks 1st in 
fragility ranking among 178 countries. It means South Sudan is the least resilient and most 
fragile country.
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As can be observed in Table 1, South Sudan and Somalia are the most fragile 
in terms of state fragility in the Horn of Africa and least peaceful in terms of 
conf lict dynamics in the world. The other four countries in the Horn have 
also been ranked high in state fragility and medium to low in peacefulness 
(for detailed discussions, see Global Peace Index 2018:9; Fragile State 
Index Team 2018:16) What follows from the analysis, is that state fragility 
and violent conf lict are so closely interlinked that these two interrelated 
phenomena shape the type and level of contemporary security of the Horn 
of Africa RSCS. This situation is daily experience in the Horn since the end 
of the Cold War and has critical security implications as discussed in the 
following section.
Implications of the nexus for contemporary security of 
the Horn
The above analysis of RSC reveals that the Horn of Africa is replete with 
actual and potential insecurities at grassroots, national and sub-regional 
levels, which emanate from the nexus between violent conf lict dynamics and 
state fragility. Internally, most of the contemporary insecurities prevalent 
in the Horn are related directly to the failure of the political leadership and 
state institutions to deliver required public goods to the citizens. Externally, 
the increased involvement of foreign countries in the Horn’s ports has 
significant impacts on the Horn itself, since the substantial f low of foreign 
funds from investments and rents from military bases give foreign actors 
considerable political and economic weight with regard to the Horn’s 
security. Resultantly, however, foreign political cleavages are transported 
into the Horn of Africa by foreign states through their financial capacity, 
by which they are capable of combining commercial deals with political 
pressure and even occasional threats of cutting off financial aid – as some 
policy analysts of the Horn of Africa think.7 Consequently, the political 
leaders of the region become more vulnerable and more loyal to the foreign 
states than to their fellow citizens. They use the money pumped in by the 
7 In-depth interview with a political/policy analyst, Addis Ababa, April 2018.
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foreign companies to maintain the security and military apparatus, which 
they use to suppress any dissenting voices of their own citizens.
Furthermore, regional balances of power also shift as hundreds of millions 
of dollars are invested and military bases are established, altering the status 
quo by funding actors involved in inter-state rivalries (see Verhoeven 
2017; Van den Berg and Meester 2018). For example, Ethiopia’s decision 
to take a 19% stake of the Berbera port deal is appreciable, as the country 
needs to diversify its reliance on Djibouti for import and export, and 
may need to keep an eye on the activities of the UAE. This might upset 
its neighbours, however, particularly Djibouti and Somalia, which are 
concerned, respectively, about losing trade and seeing a breakaway state 
gain international recognition. In the same vein, the large amounts of 
foreign funding have brought changes to local political settlements, not 
least because the funds from abroad may empower certain political actors 
within individual Horn countries to challenge existing political settlements 
in favour of the foreign powers (Verhoeven 2017; Van den Berg and Meester 
2018). The amount of the investments and their impact, have significant 
implications for internal and external security of the Horn.
Moreover, studies indicate that currently the most crucial element 
that brings Gulf capital to the shores of northeast Africa is geopolitical 
(Verhoeven 2017). The Emirati and Saudi investments in the ports of 
Berbera (Somaliland) and Assab (Eritrea) and in upgrading old and 
constructing new military facilities, the on-going Saudi support for 
Sudan’s Dam Programme, and the promises of billions of Qatari funding 
for agriculture, light manufacturing, and social services in Darfur are all 
to be understood in the light of escalating rivalries between Middle East 
sub-RSCs (Verhoeven 2017). Two fault-lines are relevant, though. Firstly, 
the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the major factor that is 
shaping much of the violence in the contemporary Middle East/Gulf RSC 
with significant impact on the Horn RSC. Teheran perceives the Saudi-
American alliance, and the attendant partnership with Israel, as the root 
cause of regional instability, and reckons that only armed resistance can 
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stop the menace of US imperialism and Wahhabism. To make matters 
worse, the renewed economic sanctions of August 2018 by the Trump 
administration on Iran might further fan the f lame in the Middle East/Gulf 
RSC with important security implications for the Horn. As a result, the 
Horn of Africa’s eastern f lank is becoming an extension of the battlefield, 
with Teheran and Riyadh accusing each other of seeking to use African 
allies to commit aggression against the other. Because of the Saudi ruling 
family’s perceptions of Iran as an existential threat, no efforts are spared to 
counter it. This has not only meant rallying all Gulf Cooperation Council 
states (including Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) to support the Saudi-led 
war in Yemen but also persuading Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia through 
investment, loans and central bank to central bank transfers to sign up to 
the pro-Saudi camp and keep Iranian ships out of the Red Sea.8
The second defining geopolitical fault-line stimulating a renewed and 
intensified interest in the Horn RSC is the growing intra-Gulf Arab enmity. 
While Saudi Arabia continues to see itself as the regional hegemon, Qatar 
and the UAE both feel capable of and entitled to an independent foreign 
policy in which they pursue their own interests in and ideological vision 
of the Middle East and Northeast Africa. Their aid and investment into 
the Horn are thus driven by the same geopolitical objectives as that of 
their Saudi friends-cum-rivals: commercial projects are first and foremost 
meant to consolidate political relations and gain greater inf luence in 
regional politics cum security (Lee 2018).
It may be inferred from the above discussions that the Horn of Africa RSC 
and the dominant states of the Middle East/Gulf RSC are locked in an 
interdependent but unequal relationship that has deep historical roots as 
well as significant power to shape the contemporary security of the Horn 
RSC. Both sides of the Red Sea have built strategies of engagement that 
allow them to maximise the benefits from the asymmetric relationship, 
in terms of their own internal political context. Economic f lows in both 
directions are subordinate to the overarching goal of maintaining power. 
8 In-depth interview with a political/policy analyst, Addis Ababa, April 2018.
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The main reason for the Horn of Africa incumbents to continue to court 
Gulf aid, investment and political support remains the same: maintaining 
regime security.
Finally, there is a serious concern that the expanded policy of the GCC, 
specifically with regard to Saudi Arabian and UAE military presence in 
Djibouti, may adversely affect Ethiopia’s interests, specifically in the 
event that tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD) escalate owing to the widely held perception that 
the GCC coalition would align with Egypt. A related fear is the prospect 
of the GCC states pressuring the Djiboutian government to apply pressure 
indirectly on Ethiopia as Djibouti is Ethiopia’s major route to a seaport 
(Zelalem 2018). 
Bearing in mind such contemporary implications of state fragility and 
conf lict dynamics for security in the Horn, it should be obvious that the 
security challenges should be approached and addressed from local, sub-
regional and global perspectives.
Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to critically examine the implications of the 
contemporary regional security of the nexus between state fragility and 
violent conf lict dynamics in the Horn of Africa. The article highlighted 
the severity of state fragility using the State Fragility Index, the pattern of 
conf lict dynamics using Global Peace Index and the nexus of the two in 
the Horn of Africa, using as analytical framework the Regional Security 
Complex. It has emphasised the significance of the current and emerging 
role of security overlays in the state fragility and conf lict dynamics in the 
Horn, thereby implying the necessity for Horn countries to develop coherent 
security policies and strategies. The study unearthed developments in 
the wider Red Sea region, which have turned the Horn’s coastline into a 
strategic location for foreign actors and resulted in an international military 
base race. The activities of these foreign powers have a significant impact 
on the security of the Horn: foreign cleavages are being imposed on the 
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Horn, fusing with the Horn’s own cleavages, while domestic and regional 
balances of power are shifting. In spite of these security predicaments, there 
are economic opportunities emerging from foreign rivalries played out in 
the Horn, and Horn governments are seizing them to maintain primarily 
their respective regime securities. Policy makers have apparently taken 
into account the increasing strategic relevance of the region to a variety of 
foreign actors and they include the role of foreign inf luences, particularly 
of the Gulf States, China and Turkey, into their thinking on the economics, 
politics, and security of the Horn’s ports and the region (Van den Berg and 
Meester 2018). 
The above analysis and discussions point in the direction of a new and 
innovative approach to contemporary security in the Horn of Africa with 
political commitment being in the forefront. Existing institutions and 
policies need to become fully capable of introducing a new regionalism 
in the Horn of Africa. What is still rampant in the sub-region, as one 
can observe on the ground, can be listed as follows: neo-patrimonialism, 
clientelism, corruption, political and economic marginalisation, nepotism, 
ethnic- or clan-based politics (with attendant internal displacement of 
persons on the basis of their ethnic identity), and dysfunctional state 
apparatus (which is merely meant to keep the regime intact). These 
practices are indeed (further) weakening social fabric and state institutions. 
Disregard for human rights, lack of commitment to eradicate poverty and 
deprivation, growing educated youth unemployment and the tendency 
to neglect global responsibilities in an increasingly integrated world are 
indeed intensifying state fragility and conf lict dynamics in the Horn. What 
fragile states therefore need, most urgently and indispensably, are strong 
institutions capable of delivering public goods, state effectiveness and 
authority with accountability, integrity, responsibility and transparency, 
as well as investing in and empowering the youth. Employing the emphatic 
phrase of the Romans, it may surely be said that such an agenda is sine qua 
non to entrench sustainable security, to provide resilience to statecraft and 
to reduce conf lict in the Horn of Africa.
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Finally, so as to address the issues of state fragility and violent conflicts in the 
sub-region, it is imperative to deal with structural violence internally as well 
as externally, rather than over-focusing on sovereignty and territoriality at 
an individual country level (even though regional security is strictly tied to 
territoriality). It is high time the Horn of Africa countries started thinking 
and acting in terms of one economic, political and security community in 
the RSC. Although at an embryonic stage, the current initiatives and positive 
moves by Eritrea and Ethiopia will be an encouraging starting point in 
the right direction to mitigate state fragility and conflict dynamics in the 
Horn. When the two countries were at war, as well as on ‘no-war, no-peace’ 
status, both Ethiopia and Eritrea sponsored armed groups to fight each 
other in proxy wars, some of which took place as far away as in Somalia. 
Each country hosted the other’s opposition or rebel groups and acted as 
safe haven by backing them financially and materially. Eritrea has border 
disputes with Sudan and Djibouti, but since Ethiopia has good relations with 
both, there is now a better chance of addressing these grievances since all of 
them are in the same RSC. And now that Ethiopia and Eritrea are no longer 
in direct confrontation, the overall stability of the Horn of Africa ought to 
improve. The Horn owns eight seaports, but stable and dependable access 
to ports for the landlocked yet rapidly growing populations and economies 
of South Sudan and Ethiopia necessitates thinking and acting in terms of 
an interdependent community that shares common security aspirations and 
fears. This is the essence of an RSC. If the political elites in the Horn start 
thinking and acting as a political/security community with committed, 
transformative and innovative leadership, contemporary regional security 
could improve and negative security externalities may give way to positive 
peace and prosperity in the Horn of Africa. 
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